The recent outbreak of measles in America, and its relationship with the anti-vaccination movement, has led to a lot of online debate. Much of this debate is about how these “anti-science” parents and the movement they listen to is increasing the risk of disease for everyone. While the increase in risk is undoubtedly a real issue, I’m not convinced by the quality of the “anti-science” framing of the issue. I’ve said before on this blog that I think the rhetoric of “anti-science” is both unproductive and unrealistic, and I think this applies even more to the anti-vaccine issue than to the GMO issue where I originally discussed it.
Much of that argument was about things written on John Quiggin’s blog, and today he has again written a post about anti-science, this time in the context of the Republican’s newfound interest in anti-vaccination ideology. The comments illustrate the pointlessness of the anti-science label well, with partisan actors degenerating into a frenzy of accusations that their opponents are anti-science, mostly without any reference to any form of evidence, or based on the kind of one-sided “facts” that Quiggin has previously associated with anti-science rhetoric. However, near the top of the comments thread a commenter called “Jim Rose” has a link to a blog post by Dan Kahan, explaining his recent work on science communication on this very issue. In a recent experiment that I briefly mentioned in my last post on this issue, people’s attitudes were categorized on two dimensions of social deviancy and risk, and then they were exposed to different forms of science communication. Those exposed to an “anti-science” diatribe divided rapidly into a group who doubled down on their views and a group who supported the anti-science framing. Kahan’s conclusion is blunt and damning for the kind of “agnotology” favoured by people like John Quiggin:
The “anti-science trope,” in sum, is not just contrary to fact. It is contrary to the tremendous stake that the public has in keeping its vaccine science communication environment free of reason-effacing forms of pollution.
i.e. the “anti-science trope” is itself anti-science, in that it does not reflect the reality of how people think about science in judging controversial issues, and is inconsistent with the best available knowledge about how to engage people with divergent views on important scientific issues.
Dan Kahan is a well-respected authority on this issue, and it’s interesting to note that he has attracted a comment from one well-known pro-science blogger, Skeptical Raptor, saying
Let me say that I’m gobsmacked as I read the conclusions. It may turn my world on its head …
Kahan’s findings on how to communicate science and how to engage objectors to particular scientific ideas basically completely oppose John Quiggin’s agnotology, and that of much of the scientific blogosphere, especially those on the New Atheist/Leftist fringe. They also back up my initial sense that this “anti-science” label is ignorant of both the reasons people take the positions they do, and the best ways to engage with them to change those positions. Kahan gives an example of a good way of engaging with anti-vaxxers, from a blog post by a pro-vaccination mother, and shows that it is nothing like what he calls the “ad hoc risk communication literature” that (in my opinion) characterizes much of the science blogging community’s response to these movements. I should also point out that I have defined a group of what I call the “scientific left,” who I roughly consider to be people like John Quiggin and myself, and Kahan’s findings (and the example he links to) are radically different to the way that the “scientific left” as I understand it engages with these movements.
There’s a lot of food for thought here, and a lot of ideas about how to better handle anti-vaccination, anti-GMO and (maybe) anti-AGW movements. It’s my personal opinion (on the basis of nothing solid, yet) that anti-AGW and pro-smoking movements are different to others, though I can’t at this stage say clearly why. I also think that the approach of people like Stephan Lewandowsky seems inferior to that of Kahan – there is value in identifying the conspiracy-theory side of AGW denialism, but the combative and confrontational nature of Lewandowsky’s work seems to disagree with Kahan’s approach. But Kahan’s work certainly suggests that the scornful agnotology of commentators like John Quiggin, PZ Myers and Dawkins, while fun to join in on from the inside, is potentially very counter-productive, and is itself “anti-science” by its own definition (which fact I find hilarious). This validates my initial suspicions about the term, and makes me think the scientific left has to do more – and be more scientific! – if we want to improve the use of science for the public good.
February 11, 2015 at 1:11 pm
“It’s my personal opinion (on the basis of nothing solid, yet) that anti-AGW and pro-smoking movements are different to others”
Have you considered the possibility that the difference between them is “I want them to be different”?
I’d not that while my view on AGW has shifted to supporting the scientific consensus, I’d still strongly oppose calling opponents in the debate “deniers” or similar. Establishing assumed ill-will on your opponents behalf is one of the fastest ways to establish tribal thinking and polarize positions till all hope of compromise is lost. A simple example of this can be seen in the US where the absolute inability of both Republican and Democrats to allow that the other side may not be working towards their nations destruction means that determining where the American political centre is is impossible [1]
“I have defined a group of what I call the “scientific left,” who I roughly consider to be people like John Quiggin and myself”
Ugh. I think I threw up in my mouth a little. So you’re finding an intersection point on two unrelated sets and then you’re going to use the existence of such an intersection as a marketing and tribalisation tool? Awesome.
The “scientific left” isn’t a useful label. I strongly suspect that it will lack predictive power or rigorous definition in exactly the same way the anti-science label (that you objected to) does.
[1] Personally, I suspect that it’s closer to the Republicans than I’d really like, and certainly to the right of Australian politics. But each nation is allowed to have different positions…
February 11, 2015 at 1:23 pm
Have you considered the possibility that the difference between them is “I want them to be different”?
Yes, and I attempt to investigate a little further in the follow-up post, with the proviso that I’m not yet convinced by my own theory. I think in past posts I have commented on how counter-productive calling people deniers is (preferring other phrases), but I still use the term as a convenient shorthand sometimes.
Re: scientific left, perhaps it’s not clear in the post but I don’t intend this as an adjective distinguishing the left from the right; rather I intend it to identify a stream of thought within the left that differs from say, principled leftism or religious leftism, which might oppose or support certain views without consideration of the scientific evidence. I also intend to counterpose this “scientific” qualifier with the actual behavior of many in the “scientific” left (such as Quiggin and Dawkins) who often seem remarkably blind to evidence that they don’t like. I certainly don’t intend it to mean that the left has some unique stranglehold on evidence-based thinking: there should also be a scientific right, a religious right, a principled right, etc. So again, it’s intended as a useful shorthand rather than a normative statement, to separate someone like me from, say, an EarthFirst! activist who might have different goals and strategies to me but would generally be classified as part of the left. I’m currently commenting on JQ’s comment thread on this issue and the more I see of the comments over there the more I think I should have put “scientific” in scare quotes for this post …
February 11, 2015 at 2:21 pm
The implicit assumption in all of this is that there is a way of persuading tribal anti-science types, and that attacking them as anti-science gets in the way of this. My experience suggests the opposite: the only thing to do is to discredit them in the eyes of those who might initially be inclined to assume that there is truth on both sides of the debate. It’s hard to be sure, but the recent evidence is that this is working as regards climate change.
http://cleantechnica.com/2015/02/05/news-climate-change-poll/
February 11, 2015 at 7:14 pm
John, first of all that’s not the implicit assumption – see the linked discussion at Dan Kahan’s, where he shows that there is a way of persuading “anti-science” types and that attacking them as anti-science gets in the way of this. It’s not just an assumption, there is evidence. Claiming that your experience trumps evidence is not really the way to go in a scientific discussion, is it? Especially when your experience is mostly spent dealing with the die-hard deniers on the internet. Dan Kahan’s work also suggests that discrediting people might not be a good approach either.
I also sometimes feel like engaging with “anti-science types” is a waste of time and it’s better just to ridicule them, and I enjoy watching a bitter stoush as much as the next pointless wastrel on the internet, but I think maybe we can do better than that, and given the importance of the AGW debate (particularly), where we can I think it’s a good idea to at least try to engage. Now I grant you, recent experience with some of the leading lights of the denialist movement suggests it’s a waste of time engaging directly with them but that doesn’t mean that you can’t try and engage those who are reading that tripe. Dan Kahan’s work suggests that the method you think is best – discrediting people – is not actually the best. See the comment on his blog from Skeptical Raptor, for more about how important this finding might be.
February 15, 2015 at 12:26 pm
I have had some policy experience in this area. Good policy involves a mix of strategies calibrated to the situation, the various target audiences and the different stages of belief. There is no one magic way. General messages, for instance, are cheap, lay the ground for incentives, but mostly miss the committed or ignorant, and have to be changed regularly. Preventing evasion is expensive, so incentives like taxes have to be matched to willingness to cooperate. Targeted messages need careful planning plus research plus time plus a cooperative channel (eg doctors in Kahan’s example). Once an issue has been reduced to a fringe, general labels (“loony”, “anti-science”) can be quite good at keeping it there. There are, for instance, still a few flat earthers. Official disapproval can be very effective if the authorities have some trust on the issue, since many people will go along with the authorities just because they are the authorities. A message that is quite effective at one stage or with one audience will be counter-productive at another. One key aim is to reduce the number and influence of the advocates, so much messaging is not aimed at the partisans but at the bystanders.
None of which applies to the net, where it’s a free-for-all.
February 15, 2015 at 12:37 pm
I wonder if one of the reasons for the resurgence of this ideology in America is the growth of personal political and religious exemptions, which were probably initially inserted into vaccination laws for valid reasons of personal freedom but have allowed the anti-vaxxers to gain some credibility and to slowly grow the size of their cohort of oppositionists. In this regard your comment “Official disapproval can be very effective” is important … being allowed to exempt yourself from a public responsibility undermines this official disapproval, and as the list of possible exemptions grows there can increasing scope for claims that the issue is not so serious.
I wonder if this might be part of the reason that the anti-choice movement in the US always tries to minimize the rape/health exemptions … because they’re trying to make a case that abortion is murder, but the more exemptions they allow the weaker their case gets.
I guess in this regard to AGW is a slightly different issue because it is not about personal choices so much as industrial reconfiguration. It requires individual consent expressed through voting, but it doesn’t necessarily require individual change (depending on how severe one believes the required mitigation policies are). So while the anti-vax industry is all about getting individuals to make a personal choice with their lives and medical decisions, the anti-AGW industry is all about getting individuals to refuse consent to a political policy. This might explain some of the conspiratorial thinking – people won’t necessarily reject a policy if they think it’s not going to harm them or change their society, even if they don’t value it personally; but if they think it’s part of a bigger plot, a cog in a larger political machine, they might reject it as part of the process of undermining the broader agenda.