Putting aside questions of economics and fault and blame and all the rest, the drama playing out in Europe over Greek default is an interesting example of the problems Europe has always faced trying to resolve its long-standing political tensions. The EU and more recently the Euro are seen in many quarters as bold attempts to reduce the risk of conflict that arises from a disunited Europe, but many euroskeptics and economists see the Euro as a very bad mechanism for doing so. War and conflict between nation-states is a political problem but the Euro is an explicitly economic process, and as the Greek drama shows, while in the good times the shared economic structures of Europe may have smoothed over some old conflicts, in the bad times they can exacerbate those same problems. Would the finger-pointing be quite as vicious if the Greeks were sovereign in their own currency? I don’t think so, and I don’t think German voters would care very much that the Greeks were about to go belly-up. There would also be no need for accusations of German bad faith – see this article, for example, as an example of insinuations that the Euro was just an exercise in destroying non-German industrial competitiveness (but bear in mind that the writer used to be an HIV-denialist, so his judgment is highly suspect).
So, putting aside the economic issues (and who in Greece wouldn’t want to!?), I think the looming default raises some interesting questions about the European experiment, and I’d like to ask two here.
Question 1: Is there any outcome but Greek exit or German defeat?
Based on reading from afar, it seems obvious that the Greek electorate aren’t going to accept austerity policies (or, more cynically, aren’t going to accept any policies dictated to them by Germany). They’re going to vote for a rejection of the austerity package and whoever wins votes on that platform will not be able to back down from that pledge. So barring some very unlikely events, the crisis will come to a head next month when an anti-austerity government tells the Germans where to put their sausage. But equally, the Germans don’t want to back down and the bigger states of Europe don’t want to be bankrolling Greece for the next couple of years – and they have their own euroskeptic hordes to appease. But the only way to prevent Greece defaulting if they reject the austerity package is to give them money for nothing, which essentially represents a complete failure of German political nerve. Furthermore, with Hollande replacing Sarkozy in France, this will also represent disunity at Europe’s core, and it’s pretty likely that other states (I’m looking at you, Italy!) will start thinking this is a) a good opportunity to get some of their own gains from that weakening core and/or b) a good chance to assert some extra authority over Europe’s future.
Is there any other outcome that can arise? The third possibility is an anti-austerity Greek government, newly-formed, accepting austerity demands. Likely? I don’t think so…
Question 2: Will Greek exit destroy monetary union?
My personal opinion is that Greece really needs to default and get out of the monetary union, and the best thing for most of the other smaller nations of the EU is to do the same thing. Greece is in the wrong part of the economic cycle for austerity, but can’t spend like a drunken sailor because Greece is not sovereign in its own currency. Obviously default and exit won’t be pretty – the New Greek Drachma will devalue, and new borrowing will be impossible for a while, I would guess – but default isn’t the end of the world, as Iceland, the UK and Argentina have all showed in the past. The alternative is basically to become a colony of Germany, incapable of competing economically or of devaluing the currency to compete through exchange mechanisms[1]. Obviously many people in Greece agree with me, because they seem pretty serious about voting in a group of political parties hell bent on this goal.
So, if Greece does exit – and especially if Greece recovers economically after the usual 10 years of torment – then what incentive will other small countries have to stay? Not only will exit have been confirmed as an option, but it will also be seen not to be the disaster that everyone expects. Some of the Eastern European satellites may consider the same options. It may begin to look like the only people who want monetary union are Germany and France, especially given their strict demands for austerity policies probably don’t match the goals of other, smaller nations. And recall, too, that some of the smaller nations have strong anti-european blocs in their local parliaments who would like nothing more than to find leverage to destroy the non-monetary, political aspects of the union.
So, if Greece exits, will the Euro die soon after? Will we see a return to separate currencies, or a collapse of monetary union to encompass just France, Italy, Germany and Poland? And would this be a bad thing?
Question 3: Is this creative destruction for Greek politics?
It should be fairly obvious that a large part of the reason Greece is in this situation is weak governance – a lot of shenanigans involving shoddy tax collecting, fraud, and poor management of public money were responsible for the sudden discovery of Greece’s financial problems. In the washup, a whole bunch of new parties (most notably the new left, but also the new right) are coming to the fore, and this raises the possibility that they might actually be able to sweep the old, corrupt stalwarts of Greek politics (such as the socialist party, which I think has been something of a perennial ruler in Greece) away from the levers of power. My guess – knowing sweet nothing about Greek politics – is that this will be essential to reforming the governance structures necessary to allow Greece to maintain responsible public spending, whether it is in or out of the union. So it may be that the crisis presently gripping Greek politics is long overdue and essential. Mustn’t waste a good crisis and all that.
So, is the current political crisis in Greece actually of huge long-term benefit to ordinary Greeks?
I wonder if there are a lot of other governments of European minnow countries looking at what is happening in Greece as an experiment for their own future. And I wonder what the average Turk thinks about their government’s long-held goal of getting into the EU. Still looking like a great move? I think people inside and outside the Eurozone might be reassessing its value rapidly …
Question 4: Is this the pro-European left’s equivalent of greenhouse denialism?
Finally, this is a coup for right-wing euroskeptics, who can point out how they were right all along. Lots of euroskeptics and economists have observed that the Euro is a bad idea. They were right, though not always for the right reasons. Was the European pro-union left blind to these messages due to ideology? And was the extent of their blindness such that it could be said to be as one-eyed and stupid as AGW denialism?
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fn1: in fact, the way some people describe it, the Euro does look a bit like a kind of fiscal version of old British colonial policy, which was to ensure that the colonies were a captive market for British manufacturing. The British did this through smashing native industry, but maybe if they’d enforced a strong monetary union they could have achieved the same thing with a bit less violence…
May 16, 2012 at 8:11 pm
The problem we face as external viewers looking in (or even if we were technically bankrupt Greeks looking out) is that I haven’t seen a good analysis of what the impact would of a default. The popular analysis seems to fall into camps of:
1. A default is unthinkable, therefore spending must be cut. Here is how and why spending should be cut.
2. A default is as least undesirable, therefore spending must be increased and a bigger debt tolerated. Here is how spending should be increased.
3. A default has no downside. Greece should go for it.
If anyone can refer me to a decent analysis that covers “The following stuff will blow-up for the reasons indicated in the column to the right”, I’d be very interested in it.
Question 1: I can’t imagine rejection of austerity leading to anything other than Greek exit. This is because to avoid an exit (as I understand it) they need someone to loan them the money. That someone needs to be all of Europe together (with Germany doing lots of the heavy lifting). If the Germans don’t get an austerity package in return why would they stump up the cash at all? It’d probably be more palatable for the Germans to just watch Greece collapse into a Mad Max post-apocalyptic setting [1]. The reason is the Germans are facing a choice of:
a) Facing a hard time propping up their banks (again) due to a Greek default undermining their banks. This is hard but at least you’re no longer associated with the idiots.
b) Facing doubling down on the bet that growth will come back and allow the Greeks to repay their debts, which recent economic history (i.e. the last 20 years) suggests is just impossible.
Of course, the real situation isn’t anything to do with Greece. It’s how to prevent it happening to Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain (in that order?). The odds are good that whatever you select for the Greeks is what you get stuck with for the rest unless you can make the Greek default so horrific that Spain and the rest play ball…
For question 2, I actually agree that default is the best option. Of course I’m encouraging it as I want to see what the result is, rather than your belief that it’ll be OK. I don’t believe that default will be as easy as Iceland or other nations, but I’m willing to be proven wrong. And if I’m right and the result is bad, then I’m OK with the Greeks suffering, so long as it leads to my nation learning the lessons from it (be they “default at will” or “defaulting hurts”). Interestingly, the Iceland Finance Minister doesn’t agree with this: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-15/greece-ireland-can-t-default-like-iceland.html but I can’t see his full reasoning anywhere. Note that Iceland took an 18% dive in disposable income after the default [2].
”The alternative is basically to become a colony of Germany, incapable of competing economically or of devaluing the currency to compete through exchange mechanisms.”
Actually the other option would be “become competitive with German”, which may well involve “have either a) worse pay/living conditions than German or b) better productivity” [3] But the Greeks don’t want to interact with that argument, so they’re immediately rejecting any option for engaging with economic reality [4].
On a related topic, why do you think that defaulting, moving to a sovereign currency and the resulting inflation (for imported goods/services) are better than forcing everyone to take a massive, German imposed, pay cut? It’s largely the same thing i.e. your salary doesn’t buy what it used to. The difference between them is that inflation is a flat tax (and hence regressive) that you can easily impose on everyone while the pay cut option is politically a nightmare [5]. But the end point is broadly similar because of the dependence on imports. They’re not even food self-sufficient (http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_01/02/2012_425569) let alone oil. Saying “Your salary won’t buy as much from overseas but it’ll still buy as much Greek stuff as you want” is the same as saying “You can eat Feta and tour the ruins repeatedly. By the way, your house may be counted as part of the tour soon.”
“Will we see a return to separate currencies, or a collapse of monetary union to encompass just France, Italy, Germany and Poland? And would this be a bad thing?”
I can honestly reply: Who knows? Who cares? Until someone explains why Europe wants an ever closer union that doesn’t refer to WWII I can’t see the purpose of it. The entire structure is an attempt to forge political unity for political unity’s sake, a sleepwalker seeking a dream to have.
Question 3: I feel sorry for the PM who came in, worked out how bad the situation was and forced the government to correct the numbers. That poor guy tries to grasp the nettle and gets told “Fuck that, we just wanted to keep our heads in the sand. How dare you be honest about the fact our nation is collectively a set of lazy bums?” What party was he in? Kudos to him for trying.
This situation, economically speaking, is probably a useful wake up call for the Greeks long term. The day after the default they’ll have a fixed amount of income (no borrowing possible) and a screwed economy (no liquidity, probable runs on banks, probable loss of any personal holdings in Euro, possible government guarantee of deposits – but it’ll be in drachmas which will go into freefall). For the couple of years after that they’ll need to clean up their tax system and only spend as much on government as they collect.
Question 4: It’s probably of the same nature as rejecting AGW theory, in as much as the theory and practical signs were there, kinda subtle but pointed out and had to be deliberately missed. It’s probably not as catastrophic, so maybe it’s better related to the left’s embrace of communism pre-Czechoslovakia. Anyone who keeps supporting it without significant policy changes after this is the same as a communist party member post 1968.
[1] Zombie economist hordes optional.
[2] This is also called “The type of income you use to buy food, petrol and pay the rent”. It’s everything you get post tax, not disposable in the sense of “money I have lying around and can blow on drugs and porn” [6]. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/disposableincome.asp#axzz1v1ueVmzR
[3] Good luck with option b.
[4] Whereas your preference for “default” is actually choosing option a in a roundabout fashion.
[5] Literally, the advantage of inflation is that you can easily lie to your people about it. Yay. They’ll probably blame the Germans.
[6] Which is obviously the optimal way to dispose of any spare cash not directly used to keep you alive.
May 16, 2012 at 9:33 pm
Thanks Paul! I think I broadly agree with a lot of this, so just picking out some of the more amusing points …
I’m happy to assume “it’s gonna suck” with a dose of “it probably won’t be as bad as the people who really need you not to default are saying” (I think those people are mostly the people who Greece owes money). I’m also willing to believe it will be a lot worse than Iceland, because Iceland has the advantage of being entirely self-sufficient in energy, having a very high standard of living anyway, being already sovereign in its own currency, and not having significant governance problems. As I often say on this blog, that governance thing is a real killer.
I read somewhere today that Greece has defaulted 5 times since the mid-19th century, and Spain 17 times. So I have to wonder – what were these banks doing lending money to Greece? I suppose one could argue they were hedging, but seeing all these people scrambling around worrying about default, I rather think the hedging wasn’t good enough. Perhaps the banks were lending money to Greece on the assumption that Germany would bail them out? (I have also read rumours that the banks most likely to take a haircut are European). Also, it’s not like Greece’s governance problems were unknown. A country that’s been out of dictatorship for, what, 40 years? and has defaulted multiple times is surely the very definition of an unreliable business partner. I think a lot of the banks that are up to their eyeballs in this trouble have been happy to play fast and loose in countries where they know corruption is rife, and I think they deserve to go down with the ship. I don’t think the EU will let them. Similarly, everyone knows that Spain’s housing boom was a shonky ponzi scheme and there was a lot of corruption involved in it – rational banks shouldn’t have been lending into that style of bubble. Not only should Greece be defaulting, but Europe should be telling its dodgier banks, “oops! You fucked that up, didn’t you?” But I suppose the bigger the economic area, the bigger the corruption…
I read today (I think in the Guardian‘s hideous liveblog) that Greek GDP has dropped by 30% in the 5 years since the crisis started. This is under the austerity program (though I guess that a large portion of that GDP drop was simply a recalculation after all the dodgy dealings were exposed). Would it have been worse if they had defaulted a few years ago? Here’s a question for the kids at the pointy end: is it better to default early, under your own steam, while the doodoo is still arcing towards the fan, or wait for the big boys to fail to sort out your situation and default only when all other options are completely exhausted and the doodoo is scattered evenly across your eiderdown? I guess a lot of Greeks can tell us the answer in a year or two …
What I’ve read suggests that the Euro has worked very well for Germany because the exchange rate mechanism forces smaller, historically economically weaker countries to be uncompetitive. Obviously with no large industrial base[1] and no history of economic development in this direction, countries like Greece are going to be unable to compete with Germany if they share its exchange rate. I think they entered the union thinking it would help them improve their productivity, but the operation of the market will guarantee the opposite – if you look at the development paths of nations like China and Thailand, initially they depend on favourable exchange rates to build up manufacturing, first through textiles and then on to light manufacturing, etc. As soon as Greece entered currency parity with Germany its industrial development stalled unless it could do b), but there’s no way a nation of Greece’s size can furnish the cash for the kind of investment needed to out-produce Germany – and why would private investors, when Germany is next door but Greek workers are being paid in Euros? And of course now option b) is impossible, because the austerity package doesn’t leave much room for infrastructure spending.
This I think is the ultimate folly of the Euro. If you want to bind Europe together against a war, you don’t need a common currency. You need a common cause, easy migration, common markets, and political will to avoid war. I think realistically there is no country in Europe that is interested in conquest anymore, nor will there be for a long time, so this spectre of European war that hangs over the EU project is misjudged. The old EU – before the Euro – was more than enough to see off war.
I bet he/she was up to their neck in the original problem. These new parties aren’t. And I think that’s Greece’s best bet for fixing its governance problems. Doesn’t mean it’ll happen, but… the optimistic scenario as I see it is that Greece defaults, returns to growth in its own way using its own currency (possibly after a long, hard road) and in the process rebuilds its political system to be more democratic and responsive, and less corrupt. I don’t think it would have been possible to achieve that latter goal in the Eurozone – the European union rewards sleazy operators like Papandreou, not genuine democrats.
The whole thing is just further proof, if any were needed, that Asia is vastly more civilized and sensible, and that the future lies in Asia. Suck it up Europe, you’re done for.
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fn1: I bet Greece has a very fine boat-building industry, but I bet it’s also a cottage industry, aimed at rich … Germans, largely.
May 18, 2012 at 8:49 am
”I’m happy to assume “it’s gonna suck” with a dose of “it probably won’t be as bad as the people who really need you not to default are saying””
I just haven’t seen any real analysis from the people who say it’s gonna suck. They seem to range between “It’ll suck, but you can survive” and “The world will end! Cats and dogs living together!” Without my analysis I can’t place a bet.
The worst case scenario I’ve managed to piece together from undergraduate theory and assorted comments is:
Greece comes up to a pay day for the public sector and has no money to pay in. They issue IOUs. The public service goes in strike shutting down hospitals. A run on the banks begins and everyone withdraws their money in Euro. The banks collapse. No medicine is being imported into the country or moved to hospitals. Petrol imports stop and the prices go through the roof, preventing the transport of food and other critical supplies. The entire economy locks up because no one can get to work. Farms lie fallow or with harvests rotting in them because farmers can’t use their equipment. Food and potentially power/water shortages start to hit major cities leading to rioting. The police haven’t been paid or fed so they join in. The damage to property and life is massive. Refugees head to neighbouring countries.
Eventually international aid arrives, food and petrol shipments unlock the ability to provide basic necessities of life but medical support remains at the level provided via international aid (i.e. broken bones are treated, people with cancer aren’t going to get drugs worth more than tens of dollars – which I believe is most of them). Restarting the economy from this situation is chaos, it’s basically shut down and had spiralling cascades of defaults. Its nigh impossible to work out who’s broke and who isn’t but you can’t nationalise everything (easily) under a democracy.
This worst case scenario would require a default with minimal notice (to maximise the shock value) and need slow international response to the developing medical/food/petrol shortages. Because of the cascade of things that need to go wrong, I think it’s pretty unlikely to get to the stage of hitting food, but I wouldn’t be surprised in the slightest to hear the medical sector has reverted to the 1940s with no advanced drugs – it’s already happening.
”What I’ve read suggests that the Euro has worked very well for Germany because the exchange rate mechanism forces smaller, historically economically weaker countries to be uncompetitive. Obviously with no large industrial base[1] and no history of economic development in this direction, countries like Greece are going to be unable to compete with Germany if they share its exchange rate.”
I think your conflating exchange rate with the cost of doing business in a country. This is true in, say, Australia where minimum wages and working conditions are constant across the country but not entirely true in Germany/Greece where the Greeks could easily say “Minimum wages in Greece are set at half the rate in Germany and your allowed to beat the slowest worker each day.”
The net effect of this would be to provide a much lower living standard and cost in Greece. Using a sovereign exchange rate to allow/drive inflation has the same net effect. In both cases it doesn’t help significantly reduce the cost of (I’m guessing) cancer medication which is made in the USA or traded in US currency, but even on there the lower amount you pay to the Greek intermediaries would help drive a lower total cost.
In the case of both inflation and cuts to wages/conditions the aim is to improve competitiveness. The sole major advantage I can see to inflation is that it’s politically easier as you can inflict it on everyone at once and things like strikes would have a very hard time being used to oppose it [1].
[1] Can you imagine a general strike demanding the government ensure inflation falls between 2% and 3%? Neither can I. I can only imagine a demand that wage growth be above CPI growth and the devil take the hindmost (the unemployed).
Germany’s advantage would be that its trade surpluses are considered in the same bucket as others trade deficits. That has the effect of making their imports more expensive and exports cheaper – a great position to be in if you’re an exporter. Greece on the other hand got imports cheaper and exports more expensive – a good position if you’re an importer and you’re not trying to address that.
”And I think that’s Greece’s best bet for fixing its governance problems. Doesn’t mean it’ll happen, but… the optimistic scenario as I see it is that Greece defaults, returns to growth in its own way using its own currency (possibly after a long, hard road) and in the process rebuilds its political system to be more democratic and responsive, and less corrupt.”
My feel is that the Greek people are still in a mindset where they see hard choices and refuse to take them. That’s why a protest party recorded such a massive vote. It’s not interested in making a choice between default and austerity, it’s in favour of demanding the good times back. Good luck with that one – I hope the German’s aren’t stupid/desperate enough to accept it.
So I would like to believe this is the start of a renewal for Greece, but frankly I think the problem begins at the root (the people), not the branch (the politicians).
May 21, 2012 at 6:14 pm
I think this conversation misses the point. It’s not a technical question – it’s a political one. And the political question is always the same – who gets the short end? In this case, German and other banks, and the Greek upper classes, or poor Greeks? No points for guessing the answer from the German viewpoint. If Greece wrtites off external debt, takes a loss on currency devaluation and concentrates foreign earnings on oil (should be able to do a great deal with Iran), it can work this out. One can, as a Swedish economist said, always build as many houses as one has hands for, cook as many meals as one has stoves and cooks and so on. The world does not fall apart just because some pieces of paper become unblessed. Cf Cuba.
As for the rhetoric about lazy Greeks and profligate Spaniards, these are mostly myths. Germany was running higher government deficits than Spain (as were the Irish). And what patronal systems like Greece lose on tax they make up on pension provision.
May 21, 2012 at 10:41 pm
I was trying to pose it as political questions, Peter T. My interest is in whether the political decisions the Greek government and people make will cause Europe to unravel, or force it in a new and unexpected direction if Germany eats humble pie.
I agree about the rhetoric about lazy Greeks and crazy Spaniards, but I think the governance problems were real. It’s not unexpected in a country that had a long period of dictatorship followed by political instability, and I think it’s a good example of how badly things can come back to bite you when you nudge-nudge and wink-wink your away around genuine governance concerns (which is what I think Europe was doing until the banking collapse). Hence my point about the German and French banks, who were quite happy to lend into a very unstable situation while they looked the other way from a system that appears to have been committing fraud from the very top down.
Interesting point about Iran – they need the foreign exchange and would no doubt love to ride in as saviors to a few struggling economies…
May 22, 2012 at 7:18 am
I can understand the belief that this is a political question rather than a technical one, but I think it underplays the effect of unintended consequences. What really happens is a political entity makes a political decision and then then technical reality tells them what the technical outcome is.
It’s all well and good to say “German chooses to screw the Greeks”, but the facts on the ground are that no one is sure how to do that without screwing everyone on the continent, including the Germans. There is probably an optimal solution which leads to a minimum level of destruction. I predict that this will be correctly identified after the fact an the political process will ensure that it is missed.
For an example of how the political and the technical are not aligning look at the markets. The markets should be pricing in the effects of the political decisions that are being signposted. But repeated political decisions (or failures to make political decisions) keep resulting the markets dropping.
Therefore allow me to predict the answer to the political question Peter T poses: Q: “who gets the short end?” A: Everyone – through a combination of incompetence, greed and indecision.
As for the Iranians and the Greeks, why would the Iranians do a deal? So they can get their hands on drachmas? Those things are going to be worthless the instant they are printed. To take whatever hard currency the Greeks can get through? That’s just as likely to be focused on food, not leaving much for oil. Plus the best way the Greeks have to get hard currency is tourism, which tends to drop off in a depressed anarchic hell hole. Iran may decide to do a deal to get political influence (in combination with some money) – but that depends on how highly they weigh Greece’s influence, which probably isn’t much (but also isn’t zero).
May 22, 2012 at 9:53 am
I think you’re being overly optimistic, Paul. The poor will get the short end, they always do. But in this case the short end will need to be renamed “the shorter end” (or “the sharper end”). Though, if New Dawn get their way it will be migrants who get the blunt end of the cudgel. I also think you’re being too pessimistic about the political process: Iceland and Argentina managed to negotiate this process, so it’s possible for Greece to as well. But it’s abundantly obvious that their two mainstream parties, saddled with greed and corruption and unwilling to accept their own shortcomings, aren’t going to be able to do it. But then again, in a political system heavy with factionalism, indecision could be the order of the day – unless this new left-wing party can make a very strong showing in the next elections, which seems unlikely.
My personal judgment, based on nothing except a few interviews and reports and secondhand accounts of the political problems Greece has experienced, is that this new left-wing party is Greece’s best bet. It’s probably relatively free of corruption and it won’t last 5 minutes if it fails to live up to its promises, which means that the Greek electorate can at least trust that a decision to reject austerity and unravel the Euro will be delivered – with all the pain and chaos that will entail. If they continue to vote for the established parties, they may get the same thing, but with less planning and a much greater interest in protecting the political elites and their fellow travelers – which has been part of the problem up until now.
My personal judgment is based on a wider judgment that the Euro is poison for everyone except Germany. Small countries should be getting out now before they face the same problems Greece has. The lesson of the Euro is that it is very very dangerous to give up currency sovereignty to a greater economic power – you’ll be forced to run your economy under their fiscal and monetary conditions, not your own, and while that may look inviting at some points in history, it’s only of long term benefit if that power can guarantee you that they will look after you when the economic conditions turn against you. But Germany have shown they won’t bend their ordoliberal principles, or at least that a problem will be allowed to get very bad before they will compromise. It’s not a good deal for a small country.
May 22, 2012 at 12:32 pm
Sorry – I overstated. On Paul’s point – the ‘technical reality” is constructed. It’s not a given. So, for instance, the Greek state could abandon the euro, repudiate overseas debts, impose currency controls, encourage local production, impose tariffs, nationalise the shipping industry and then lease it to Iran…Then’s a long menu, from the likely to the unlikely, with different costs and likely consequences in terms of others’ decisions (also political). They can threaten some things they don’t want to do just to gain negotiating leverage. The technical realities will be reconstructed to meet the political need. The question is – whose political need.
On patronal systems (like Greece, the Philippines, Israel, Thailand) yes, they are mostly bad at collecting taxes, and corrupt by the standards of a Weberian bureaucratic state. They recirculate wealth through non-bureaucratic channels. Is it as efficient? Possibly not. But it often has a more human feel, and it’s hard to shift. Demanding the Greeks become Germans seems to me a non-starter.
I donb’t know if the Euro by iteself need be poison. But coupled with open borders and free flow of capital it is. I believe Keynes made this point – that capitalism is more stable if flows of trade and capital are dampened. A local currency is one way of doing this, but there are others.
May 24, 2012 at 12:04 pm
“The poor will get the short end, they always do.”
This is cynicism posing as wisdom. In fact in a situation like this there are lots of ways the poor are relatively best positioned. Imagine two people, one a Greek merchant banker and the other a small crop farmer in Greece.
The merchant banker would be well served by shitting himself every hour on the hour. Best case scenario he ends up losing a stack of money but is still wealthy at the end, worst case scenario he loses everything in successive waves of market collapses, tax increases and currency controls.
The poor farmer on the other hand has nothing but upside. He wasn’t receiving patronage from the state, so its collapse can’t cut his pension or wage. And the fact he produces food is going to become very helpful in the near future once imports dive. Worst case scenario he can feed himself, best case scenario he finds a starving ex-merchant banker and demands the remains of the rich man’s estate in return for a meal.
In reality, the exact impact will vary wildly depending on individual circumstances. A pensioner is going to take a massive loss, someone needing lots of health care is going to go without but this is just as true for rich pensions and unhealthy rich people as their money becomes worthless with forced drachma-isation. A mentally ill person living on the streets and getting no government benefits is going to notice that the uptick in looting significantly improves their quality of life. Anyone employed at any level (be it bank teller or CEO) is going to be rolling the dice and seeing if they have a job tomorrow and the CEOs pay out may not be better than the tellers (worse if you factor in the risk of jail time).
So I can understand the concern for the poor (and I’m not arguing that we shouldn’t be), but I think this could get nasty enough that saying the poor suffer the most is just going to be statistically untrue.
”My personal judgment, based on nothing except a few interviews and reports and secondhand accounts of the political problems Greece has experienced, is that this new left-wing party is Greece’s best bet.”
It would be nice if the Greek populace was correctly leaning towards the white knights who would arrive and remove the broken system that has been built up, but I don’t think that’s what the new party is talking about.
This article: http://www.theage.com.au/business/world-business/germany-holds-gun-to-greeces-head-20120524-1z665.html has a line that “undermining claims by Greece’s radical anti-austerity leader, Alexis Tsipras, that Europe would not dare pull the plug.”
That matches my fears that the new guys are saying (at best) “They can’t kick us out, so lets insist on getting a better deal that we like” or (at worst) “As long as we’re stubborn enough, the good times will come back.” I don’t think either of those options are acceptable to Germany as the former would require a either a deal that was so good it couldn’t be funded (as it’ll have to cover Spain, et. al. too) or still not good enough. And the later is the cry of a madman.
When your final defence seems to be “Athens was also a “co-owner” of the project and could not be ejected from a union it had participated in for over 30 years.” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/17/austerity-will-send-greece-to-hell-alexis-tsipras) you seem to be working on an overly optimistic basis.
May 24, 2012 at 1:03 pm
And here are the first signs of the health crisis I outlined above:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/23/greece-debt-creating-healthcare-crisis
For the record, I think it’ll get worse than this. Cancer sufferers not getting drugs will be the first stage. Wait till AIDS retrovirals become in short supply.
I’ll also bet that this will continue till well after the debt situation is sorted out, probably to the stage that the rest of Europe just starts sending supplies.
And, as an aside, this is a good example of why saying “It’s a political question” misses the point. The politicians are fundamentally of the opinion that its a political question and therefore nothing important will happen until a political answer is made. But in fact it’s a technical question [1] and in lieu of a real answer, the politicans answer will be assumed to be “Stuff around at a series of conferences while the technical answer beats the crap out the actual people of the country.”
[1] The question being “Do you have drug X is stock? What do you mean no one in Greece has that one?!”