Obamacare has been in place for barely a week, and already the medical journals are publishing editorials and opinion about it. The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) is particularly interested in health finance reform in America, and has been publishing a lot of speculative material on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for a long time now, but this week it has three editorials in the same issue all discussing various specific aspects of the challenge of funding healthcare in the USA. These three editorials serve to show how complex health financing policy is, how hard it is to iron out all the flaws in any system, and how much reform is still needed in the USA. To the extent that it’s possible to characterize the editorial policies of a peer-reviewed medical journal, I think it’s safe to say that the NEJM is broadly supportive of health system reform in the USA, and supportive of Obamacare but probably generally hoping for better. Certainly articles about America’s reform journey over the past few years, along with research into specific aspects of health system challenges in the USA, have been getting a big run in the NEJM.
The first of the editorials, The ACA and High-Deductible Insurance, describes an unexpected (to me) and unfortunate side-effect of the ACA: the introduction of new, cheap insurance plans with very high deductibles of up to $10,000 per patient. The NEJM describes these policies as “blunt instruments” and suggests they are the fault of Congress focusing on market-based cost controls. These high-deductible cheap plans are necessary because the ACA will mandate all Americans must have a form of health insurance, but many individuals not able to get employer-funded plans will simply not be able to afford standard plans, so they will need to buy cheap high-deductible plans. The editorial points out the potential costs of this and gives a fairly strong judgment of its worth at a population level when it says:
previously uninsured people might effectively become underinsured, and their aggregate health and economic outcomes might not improve substantially. The United States seems destined for a “bronze” health insurance system that could create financial burdens high enough to cause adverse outcomes in vulnerable populations.
Their argument in support of this is that there is some evidence that high-deductible plans discourage use of discretionary and essential health care, which means that basically a group of working poor are being forced to take up a product (health insurance) that they can’t afford to use and that is essentially just going to act as a safety net for extreme emergencies only. The editorial also points out that there isn’t actually much research on high deductible plans and their effects, and the USA is about to embark on a big experiment with these instruments. My view, of course, is that the American people are being sold short by the politicians’ naive distrust of socialized solutions, and its refusal to properly fund this essential service: so instead of having a properly run and well-subsidized single-payer system for all the working poor (i.e. an expansion of medicare/medicaid to cover a very large part of the population) the govt has opted to force those poor people to fork out for a very poor quality product. I guess given the shenanigans in the House and Senate over the past two weeks, no one should be surprised.
The editorial suggests an interesting, almost libertarian solution: that employers should facilitate payments into health savings accounts (HSAs) for these working poor. HSAs get favourable tax treatment and could basically be used to cover the deductible part of the health care plans, reducing their negative effects on healthcare access. But reading the list of recommendations in the editorial, it seems to me that they are all very poor attempts at putting lipstick on a pig, which either end up costing the working poor more, or falling back on vague and hopeful benefits from poorly-researched policy ideas. I don’t blame the authors, because I guess that’s what you are left scrabbling to do when you are dealing with a political class as timid and out of touch as that of the USA.
The second article, finely entitled The Thousand-Dollar Pap Smear, describes some of the crazy ways in which the US health financing system works to drive up costs. This article has a very well-crafted introduction, which first points out that the physician author has actually seen bills of $600 or $1000 for a mere pap smear, and then links the cost of smears to the broad sweep of cervical cancer protection in the modern world:
Cervical-cancer screening is one of the 20th century’s true public health successes. The incidence of a disease that once caused more deaths among American women than any other form of cancer has decreased dramatically since the introduction of routine Pap smears in the 1970s. In the modern era, most deaths due to cervical cancer occur among women who have never been screened or who have gone decades without screening. One of the main factors in helping to conquer this once-dreaded disease has been the availability of a cheap, effective screening test that can detect disease early, while it’s still very treatable. Yet increasingly, in my roles as the chief medical officer of a community health center and as a family doctor seeing patients in that system, I hear from women who are choosing to skip their screenings because of skyrocketing costs.
She then describes how it is possible for a pap smear to cost $1000, and it’s a pretty embarrassing process. Part of the blame for this lies with physicians and part with the pathology companies, who have developed new and cunning ways to ensure that the physician orders, by default, tests that are not needed. They use systems of defaults and check boxes, and do their best to keep the actual pricing opaque:
Costly tests that once would have required physicians to submit multiple collection vials and specimens can now be ordered with the Pap smear simply by clicking a single box in the electronic medical record. Nothing at any point along the way alerts either the clinician or the patient to the high costs of these tests or to the fact that there is little medical evidence to suggest that they are useful for most patients.
The author compares this behavior to that of pharmaceutical companies. It’s also an example of how little control ordinary patients have over health prices, and how invulnerable the system is to individuals’ price negotiations. In many cases, the women receiving the smear don’t know what tests are being done – they just assume it’s the pap smear they asked for or had recommended to them – and are shocked when they receive the bill. The risk from this is that women won’t undergo the pap smear, because they can’t control the price they end up paying. As we will see in the next article, negotiating over price is difficult.
As a final parting shot, the author points out something that is genuinely amazing about the US system, and which makes it even harder to argue for the benefits of price control through individuals negotiating with their doctor:
The final step in creating these astronomical bills for women without health insurance is that some laboratories charge uninsured women vastly inflated amounts, while offering insurers steep discounts from these “usual fees.” Although some laboratories offer discounts to uninsured patients, others do not, leading to the phenomenon well documented in other areas of medicine in which the uninsured pay premium rates, often having to set up multiyear payment plans for services for which a health maintenance organization would have paid a fraction of the charges.
This has always struck me as crazy, but seems to be a common problem in the USA: prices are not fixed by the cost of providing the service, but are based on what the company is able to gouge from the patient. In the case of uninsured women, women relying on HSAs, or women obtaining insurance from a private, individually purchased (rather than workplace or group-purchased) insurance plan, they have no group negotiating power, and the laboratories simply charge them more because they can. The same bill sent to a health insurance company would be sent back with a sneer – or wouldn’t be sent because the company had negotiated a bulk rate – but for a woman negotiating alone, the price is fixed as high as possible. Most ordinary consumers of healthcare are unlikely to even realize they are being gouged, let alone have the power to negotiate.
The final editorial ties this together with a discussion of the similarities between out-of-pocket payments and treatment side-effects. This article points out the high cost of out-of-pocket payments in the USA, and gives some hideous examples:
The Center for American Progress has estimated that in Massachusetts, out-of-pocket costs for breast-cancer treatment are as high as $55,250 for women with high-deductible insurance plans; the out-of-pocket costs of managing uncomplicated diabetes amount to more than $4,000 per year; and out-of-pocket costs can approach $40,000 per year for a patient with a myocardial infarction requiring hospitalization.
Some of these out-of-pocket costs are above the median income of the USA, so there is no way that the majority of the population are going to be covering them from petty cash – you’re looking at years of savings, remortgaging houses, or other distress financing, to cover diseases that are common in the life course. And these costs are being paid by people with insurance plans – they have already paid into some kind of risk pooling mechanism before they wear these costs. In research in developing nations, we refer to these effects as “financial catastrophe due to out-of-pocket payments” and “distress financing related to healthcare costs,” and most developing nations are working on universal health coverage plans to try and eliminate these payments. Yet Obamacare intends to do nothing about this aspect of the system: the working poor in the USA will be able to afford nothing better than these high-deductible plans. The article suggests that physicians should start including discussion of out-of-pocket costs in their routine discussion of the risks and benefits of the treatment, and gives several reasons for this, some of them directly related to health. These include:
- Patients often don’t raise the costs initially, but bad experiences with costs may lead them to reject subsequent treatment suggestions, avoiding essential care before they know what it will cost (or because they can’t trust the cost, in the case of the $1000 pap smear)
- Patients who know the costs in advance can prepare, and avoid the worst forms of distress financing
- Often there are cheaper alternatives to the standard treatment, or special plans (research projects, government support) that can be used to reduce the burden of payment; discussion of these issues upfront can help patients to choose a care package they can afford
I’m really surprised that in a society with as much upfront payment and as much fear and concern about health costs as USA (and where health costs are so high!), physicians don’t routinely talk about this in the consultation. I remember my local dentist here in Tokyo had a tick box on the registration form when I first visited that asked if I wanted to only receive treatments fully funded by my insurance plan. Surely US doctors should be doing this? But apparently, despite years of debate about health financing, it’s not routine in the clinical visit. The editorial also points out that there is a real lack of information, so often even clinicians can’t work out clearly how much a procedure will cost (see, again, the $1000 pap smear); some States have even passed special laws to help with this! How is it possible to be an informed consumer if a) the person providing the service is reluctant to talk about the price, b) the person providing the service controls all knowledge about alternative products, and c) the person providing the service can’t tell you how much it will cost? For people on high deductible plans, this minefield of price negotiations is going to come straight from their pockets. It’s fairly obvious that in this situation many people would forego care before they even know its price – it turns a visit to the doctor into a kind of gambling game, with only negative outcomes. Who wants that?
My guess is that this issue is going to come to the fore over the next few years as millions of people enrol in health insurance that can’t help them. The Democrats now own Obamacare, and the way they have set it up means that they now also own all the problems that the private market presents to the millions of people who will begin to experience it for the first time. I guess this means that sometime in the next few years we will see a concerted attack on high deductible plans. That is going to be impossible though, unless the government is willing to engage in a bit of socialist interference in the market. If they don’t, will Obamacare deliver benefits worth the huge political battle it took to implement? And if they do, will the USA be able to present a largely free market solution to the challenge of universal health coverage? My guess is that the answer to both of those questions will be “no,” and the USA will either continue to struggle with a broken system, or finally bite the bullet and go for a full universal health system. Sadly, probably, the broken system will prevail.
Still, at least since this morning’s vote on the debt ceiling we at least get to see how the story ends. I’m glad I’m not part of the narrative, though!
October 19, 2013 at 5:48 pm
The American legal system is likely to play into the overblow costs fairly directly too. While, I’ve heard stories of doctors sued for missing symptoms or not ordering a check, I’ve never hear of a doctor being sued because the bill was massive [1].
If a doctor has the following choices:
A: order every test under the sun to minimise legal risk and stiff the ignorant patient with the bill
B: order the test asked for and risk getting sued because they didn’t test for “random shit that happens in the same body part, or even somewhere totally different, but regarded as a standard test cause the form is setup that way”
C: Explain the likely costs to the patient, but without being too clear as it’s damned hard to work out, and piss time up the wall that you could be spending charging someone else.
Basically B and C involve a probable lose of income for the doctor and A involves a lose of money for the patient. The doctor is a rational, utility maximising individual (because economics assumes this for us) therefore they chose the option that doesn’t screw them over.
[1] Clearly, setting such a precedent would be a risk to the legal profession and is therefore against the principles of natural justice to allow. [2]
[2] Yes, I do think lawyers build rules beneficial to them into the law, such as not allowing lawyers to be sued for fraud/being a lying scumbag.
October 21, 2013 at 12:25 pm
This is only tangentially related, but National Review Online [1] has an article assessing the initial ObamaCare performance: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/361577/assessing-exchanges-yuval-levin
This raises an interesting point about what the technology really means:
The fate of these sites [the health exchange websites] is the fate of Obamacare, for reasons that may not be immediately obvious. Health insurance is highly sensitive to the integrity and robustness of the market in which it is sold: though we don’t often think of it this way, health insurance is a financial service, a protection against risk, so the nature and structure of a given insurance plan is highly responsive to the scope and the character of the demand for it at any given time. It is in this sense rather different from most consumer products. This means it is not possible to think of the exchange websites as just sites where products are sold, and to believe that the product is fine but the site has some glitches. If the site doesn’t work, the product cannot work, and the insurance market created by the law cannot be sustained. So a great deal is at stake here, and it now seems a great deal is at risk.
It’s not something I’d directly considered, so it’s interesting to see a technology problem being called out as directly related to an economic/market problem (i.e. effective risk pooling) and through that to health outcomes.
[1] Right wing, but this article doesn’t appear to have the crowing attitude about that you’d see in their comment section (maybe a little at the end).
October 22, 2013 at 1:27 pm
Paul
The cost issue is not one of over-prescribing, but of wildly varying charges for the same treatment and wild over-charging for standard treatments. An uninsured patient will be charged $500 for what an insurer pays $50, a generic medicine will be charged $500 in the US but $50 in Canada and so on. And these are not doctor’s charges, but medical insurance or other admin layer, or corporation charges. The French medical system, IIRC, has a higher usage rate than the US (more tests, more procedures), but costs around a third less – there’a a whole industry battening on the consumer.
October 22, 2013 at 6:43 pm
Peter,
That’s part of the issue described by the articles’ quotes, however needless over testing is also an issue identified in the quote, specifically: ” Nothing at any point along the way alerts either the clinician or the patient to the high costs of these tests or to the fact that there is little medical evidence to suggest that they are useful for most patients.”
So the patient is being ripped off in two ways 1) selective overcharging to some categories of patient; and 2) deliberately encouraging over testing .
I’m suggesting that one driver for acceptance of over testing by the doctors is legal risk aversion.
If the French system does more tests, that doesn’t mean that over testing is good, nor that it’s not a part of the problem. It merely would demonstrate that over testing is not an insurmountable problem if other controls are in place. Practically speaking selective over charging may not be a problem if other controls were in place too (NB I’m not going to advocate it as it would require supporting deliberately discriminatory charging).
October 22, 2013 at 7:05 pm
Peter, I think overprescribing is also an issue, though I don’t think the articles indicate which is the bigger one. I suspect that the French system does what the Japanese system does and has strict price controls that mean there is no way that selective overcharging can be applied. It is in systems like that that over-servicing becomes a big issue, since adding extra tests (for example) is one of hte only ways to increase profit for one service. Most single-payer systems have strict methods for controlling the charging part of the system. I guess the free-market approach favoured in the USA would argue that competition would drive that overcharging away (or down) but it clearly doesn’t happen. I think this might be because of the strange way in which “customers” judge “price” in a health insurance system. Basically in order for competition to reduce or eliminate overcharging, the customer of insurance (i.e. the patient) would have to be able to compare all the prices they might pay in future for different health insurance plans, and from this comparison be able to judge which plan best suits their projected future health needs. That’s a very informed customer! And particularly difficult since even doctors and researchers don’t know exactly what the full range of prices is. One could argue that the insurance companies could do it but I don’t think there is a market incentive for them to do that, since they know the customer has no clue about what future prices they will face. This would be an especially serious problem for people buying insurance as individuals, or for people buying insurance with large co-payments. And of course, the moment you are stung with a payment you didn’t predict and aren’t protected from, you as a consumer realize you don’t know how to judge the market, so then you have no ability to swap to a “better” plan.
Paul, I don’t know enough about insurance generally to say whether or not I agree with the claim that the delivery mechanism is part of the product as per the NRO article (I think I can see the logic of this). However, I will say that Obama’s plan puts a lot of weight on big IT projects: not just the exchanges for comparing prices, but also some savings he is assuming will arise from predictive models of hospital usage. I’m sure you’re aware of the dangers of resting a successful plan (any plan, public or private) on a big IT project! This isn’t entirely Obama’s fault: he had to come up with a broadly free market, private, non-public plan because of the political realities he faces, and obviously a part of this plan will be informed consumers making price comparisons. I can see the allure of a big IT project for this task. But it’s obviously a very dangerous policy path to go down. I read Krugman today suggesting the federal exchanges are fine and the state ones are borked, but I doubt it’s that simple; on the other hand Crooked Timber has a post pointing out that the people responsible for messing up the exchanges are part of the eternal govt contractor loop, and this kind of incompetence might have been expected of them (apparently McCain said “can’t they just fly Airforce One to silicon valley and recruit a bunch of techheads to do this properly?” But that is a variant on the same problem, I suppose). I think maybe the modern world might be running into situations where complex, public/private cross-over plans like this one are heavily dependent on big IT projects that can’t actually be expected to work, and that sometimes a simpler, less ideal solution would be better if it can avoid those projects. But I could just be making a natural law of complexity out of something that is more easily explained by a natural law of incompetency. And it’s been a long time since America’s healthcare system could have laid any claim to organizational competency!
re: compensation and litigation, no doubt it’s a part of all this but I doubt that’s the main reason over-servicing happens (and the articles don’t single that out as a cause). I think it might be a common refrain amongst doctors because they like to blame others for their own profit-gouging. Litigation risk also differs a lot between specialties and I think it might be the case that one of the highest litigation specialties (Obstetrics) is also the least likely to be covered by market-based private insurance. So that could be evidence in favour of your theory. However, I think broad systemic issues are more relevant than litigation – it’s something that needs to be dealt with but could probably wait, I suspect, until the broader financing system is working!
October 22, 2013 at 9:35 pm
I should add I think I misremembered Krugman, who I think said the opposite of what I wrote up there – that some state exchanges were good. I think he’s paywalled for me now so I can’t check. I also note that the NRO article completely fails to lay even a single percent of blame at the feet of the private insurers, even though they have no natural reason to want to cooperate. Still not sure what I think of the idea that the delivery system and the product itself are entangled. And yes, remarkably balanced given a) it’s NRO and b) my god the comments!
October 23, 2013 at 9:18 am
“Still not sure what I think of the idea that the delivery system and the product itself are entangled.”
I don’t think the relationship the writer proposes is as direct as this. It’s more the product depends on creating a risk pool, but the delivery system is going to repel the low risk people that you’re trying to attract into the risk pool because they don’t have an incentive to put up with IT pain.
On Crooked Timber and pointing the finger at the external contractors, I can contribute two things 1) I’ve read the integration was retained by the government agency and 2) based on my experience as an IT project manager the integration is the single thing most likely to go wrong.
Speaking personally, if I could run everything on a project but the integration I’d seize that opportunity. The reason why is that integration is where the communication problems from the start of the project manifest [1].
Additionally, working out who’s really at fault for integration issues is nigh impossible because there tends to be some other proximate cause to hide your mistakes behind [3]. Depending on the organisation culture the answer tends to be either “Everyone”, “No one”, “The process”, “The external contractors” or “The PM”.
So I’d hesitate to accept this desire to shift the blame to the contractors. Practically speaking the people in charge of managing the contractors (i.e. the government department) were in charge of making sure the contractors didn’t stuff up. And I’d bet that the contractors systems meets all the requirements set – it’s just the requirements will be poorly chosen ones [4]. IT contractors are like genies – you’ll always get what you ask for and rarely what you want.
[1] The typical example is “What do you mean there are 5 fields you needed? The spec says I should pass you 4. It’ll take 2 months to add the extra field (due to change requests, design, approvals, re-build, re-test and regression testing)!” [2]
[2] Welcome to the nightmare that is my life.
[3] Such hiding mistakes is the art of project management. “Quick guys, we’ve got 5 days while the other team fixes it’s mistake to fix the mistake we found, if we beat them to it, it’s like our work was never flawed!”
[4] Requirements on a part of an integration project is likely to be “Must respond inside X seconds” because you can’t put a requirement on a single part of the system that “The entire thing works”.
October 23, 2013 at 11:22 am
On the “Are the contractors to blame” question, I’ve found two interesting articles:
1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/2013/10/21/161a3500-3a85-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html
This article identifies late testing of the end to end process. I’d call that a failure of overall project management [1] which resides with the government agency. It also cites several problems that are apparent in the individual components, including describing some hints of problems that are hidden behind the initial registration issue (as per my prediction in the post above).
2. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/21/healthcare_gov_problems_why_5_million_lines_of_code_is_the_wrong_way_to.html
This Slate article sounds right on the money to me in saying the entire project is citing really worrying stats. If they think their healthcare code should be bigger than a banks software code then either a) they’re coding stupidly for some reason (such as poor incentives); b) the legislative requirements for the healthcare are stupidly complex [2]. This sounds like a vendor management failure [3].
[1] If anyone from the US Government wants to read this, I’ll give you a couple of the timelines you need to put in your plan:
1. 3 months of end to end integration testing and fixes in a test environment
2. 1 month of installing it into production and performing load testing on prod
Based on that I’d say it’ll start working acceptable around the end of Jan, though it could be crunched by up to a month if they work hard or delayed a couple of months because they’re trying to support a live system and fix the problems rather than just focusing on fixes. Everyone who tells you shorter timeframes is a crazed optimist – don’t trust them.
[2] Its unlikely this is the case. Banks software includes code to address legislative/regulatory nonsense such as the Dodd Frank Act. If the healthcare legislation is comparable in complexity then it’s just doomed to fail under the weight of its own unwieldiness – and I don’t have any reason to believe that is the case given the degree of detail I’ve heard sounds like it is understandable (with effort) to a single human mind.
[3] I have some sympathy for the government agency here. They’re specialists in healthcare and the contractors, despite what may be claimed, are not specialists in technology. The contractors are specialists in setting up contracting contracts – the government agency was always going to be taken for a ride.
October 26, 2013 at 2:21 pm
I see what you mean now about the delivery system, and I can see the point – driving away the low risk customers could be possible if the interface is bad, and could undermine the package. But this idea that the health insurance industry is going to be somehow able to sustain itself and form a universal health coverage (UHC) system if they can just enrol low-risk customers (young men and women) is pie in the sky stuff anyway. No country with a fully functioning UHC system funds that system entirely from premiums. They all have some kind of cross-subsidization from general taxation, and often (as in e.g. Australia) quite a lot of support for private insurance companies as well. Because Obamacare is held hostage by free market ideology, they’re cleaving to the idea that they can construct a sustainable UHC system based almost entirely on the private market, but that’s not going to work. At some point they’re going to need to intervene more directly in the market to sustain it, either by direct subsidization, direct cost controls, or enlarging the risk pools (which in practice will mean expanding medicare or forcibly merging smaller insurers). Or they’ll end up with a UHC system like China had – one where people are “covered” but the coverage is basically nominal, and doesn’t benefit most people in most circumstances. The Chinese govt realized the uselessness of that and have been working on improving their system for a few years now, but doing so has meant throwing away the idea that they can leave it to the market. At some point the USA is going to have to come to the same realization.
So in that sense driving away the lowest risk customers might shorten the time it takes to come to terms with the reality of financing UHC, but that’s probably all.
Regarding IT projects, I would have thought in a project of this size there was more than enough blame to share around. And I think your footnote [3] is important: it takes a long time for a government with good governance and accountability mechanisms and a robust public service to become adept at negotiating large contracts with the private sector, and I don’t get the impression that the USA is such a govt. So of course when you decide to run a huge IT project that’s crucial to your legislative agenda by contracting it out, you’re going to get fleeced. This is ironic because the USA actually has a couple of really well-regarded, internationally-respected healthcare systems run within the govt (Medicare and Veterans Affairs) that could have probably done the job well and at a lower cost. But again – hidebound ideological constraints prevent the govt from doing what govts are meant to do, and instead have it shoveling money into private sector agents under bad terms. I think this was the point the Crooked Timber post was trying to get at – that the US govt is a victim of some kind of networks of patronage that prevent it from making the best use of its resources and therefore FEUDALISM. I confess I don’t get the second half of that logical flow, but I think the point that these networks of patronage are problematic in a weakly-governed state should be fairly self-evident.
Obamacare therefore, to me, seems to be resting on a whole bunch of really unrealistic assumptions – about the power of the market to control prices and deliver the best deals, about the power of knowledge to reduce healthcare costs and prevent unnecessary services, about the ability of a government to run a really large IT project on time and on budget, and about the superiority of contracting vs. in-house development for big govt projects. Put that all together and you get an obvious high-risk policy with a high-risk implementation. Let’s hope that once the IT part is out of the way, the actual implementation of the policy itself works better!
October 28, 2013 at 1:15 pm
”they can just enrol low-risk customers (young men and women) is pie in the sky stuff anyway.”
While this gets back into your bulwark, it doesn’t seem impossible to me. The government intends to increase tax on people who don’t sign up. They also have the power to set a minimum level of coverage required. With those two things it’d seem the government is perfectly able to select what the nation’s risk appetite is for healthcare is.
”it takes a long time for a government with good governance and accountability mechanisms and a robust public service to become adept at negotiating large contracts with the private sector, and I don’t get the impression that the USA is such a govt.”
My point is actually more cynical than that. It’s that in any discussion with an outsourcing you basically have one organisation that specialises in (say) healthcare, running an army, overseeing a treasury or banking. And the other organisation specialises in making money from outsourcing. When it comes to discussions between such entities, the outsourcing specialist is almost always going to “win” the discussion [1] the same way that a university trained mathematician is almost always going to win discussions on maths with high school students. There are simply worlds of stuff that the outsourcer knows about that the outsourcing entity doesn’t. For example the outsourcer has seen lots of ways that outsourcing entities screw up and can account for lots of them, by contrast the outsourcing organisation doesn’t know how the outsourcer intends to screw them [2].
”the USA actually has a couple of really well-regarded, internationally-respected healthcare systems run within the govt (Medicare and Veterans Affairs) that could have probably done the job well and at a lower cost.”
Hmm, it’s more complex than that. This is a new system with new, complex interfaces and rules. If the Medicare and Veterans Affairs operators are good at quickly building expansions that are radically different to what they’re already doing, then yes, that would make them good candidates for Obamacare’s site. But it’s more likely that Medicare and Veterans Affairs are good at running their existing systems and slowly evolving them, which is a very different proposition [3].
”But again – hidebound ideological constraints prevent the govt from doing what govts are meant to do, and instead have it shoveling money into private sector agents under bad terms.”
Hmm. Not quite. I am harsh towards outsourcers, but it’s not hard to find a list of government cock-ups as long as your arm [4]. Really it seems to boil down to “Choose your poison”.
”I think the point that these networks of patronage are problematic in a weakly-governed state should be fairly self-evident.”
Yeah, systems setup to distort decision making successfully distort decision making. Please don’t take my ambivalence to government work v outsourcing as an endorsement of corruption.
[1] In the sense of getting the contract set up in a way that is optimal to them
[2] Note: My statements above are based on the idea that the outsourcer is trying to screw the outsourcing organisation. This isn’t quite true in practice, for the same reason that shearers don’t kill the sheep while shearing them. But when push comes to shove you have to expect the outsourcer to be on their own side, not that of the outsourcing entity because the outsourcer isn’t crazy.
[3] Take the fact that the need to register prior to selecting a plan as an example. That’s a significant change to Obamacare that happened at the last minute.
[4] Something about NHS systems comes to mind, but I can’t recall the details…
October 28, 2013 at 4:36 pm
The examples you’ve given are a combination of regulation and taxation (with implied subsidization), so I’m going to take them as reinforcing my point. It’s certainly possible to have a “free market” UHC system, such as Obamacare, which if well run and organized (haha) will achieve most of its goals. But it’s going to need a lot of regulation and cross-subsidies of the kind you’ve suggested – it’s not going to work just by finding ways to force young people to sign up. I guess you could be right and it will work just from tax penalties for the young and healthy sufficient to guarantee they take on health insurance, but such a system will be extremely politically unpopular and won’t last. What will happen in such a situation is that a bunch of healthy young people will find themselves being forced to either pay huge tax penalties or pay premiums on a completely useless minimum package of insurance that they only took up because the tax penalties were so huge. The only way to stop these people voting for the party that will dismantle that system is to find a way to make the minimum level of coverage from that insurance package appealing, and given that the insurance companies don’t want to offer such a package, the govt is going to have to force them, or subsidize them (or more likely, a little of both). I think Obamacare involves some of both of those tactics, but what I’ve seen in the NEJM articles I linked to suggests that the subsidies aren’t very good (hence the increase in high-copayment plans they are worrying about). So my guess is that the subsidies won’t be enough to make the program politically sustainable, and will have to be tinkered with.
I was thinking in terms of minimizing the damage, not eliminating it, so I guess I was being cynical too. Also often “outsourcing” is not really set up by governments as a coherent policy implementation framework, but as a poor alternative to proper cost management, or from some kneejerk ideological notion that outsourcing is cheaper. I think if outsourcing were approached as a serious policy implementation vision, governments would naturally look for ways to manage and govern that process, and would soon set up contracting departments that would be ferociously good at screwing the contractors they were outsourcing to. A good example of this is medicare in Australia, or the Japanese system of healthcare purchasing. Both of these essentially envisage outsourcing as a core component of the implementation framework – they outsource primary care (in Australia) or all medicine (in Japan) to private contractors (doctors). In order to do this they have a large infrastructure for setting fees, managing the contracting process, and negotiating prices. The result is an extremely cost-competitive system in which the government and its electors are satisfied they’re getting value for money. If governments took a similarly bloody-minded approach to IT contracting instead of seeing it as an easy alternative to in-house planning, design and implementation, they might actually not get fleeced. But I think most politicians and policy-makers don’t see outsourcing in that way.
I can’t rightly recall, but I think when I wrote the paragraph you’re responding to I was thinking in terms of expanding Medicare to cover all the uninsured, not using it to implement the IT program. That’s not clear from the text, so maybe that’s not what I was thinking. If not, then I agree with your point. Medicare and VA wouldn’t necessarily be better at implementing a new and different computer system.
Although it’s not hard to find long lists of government cockups, some seem to be longer and more disturbing than others. The NHS, for example, has areas of excellence (such as hte huge gains in child mortality achieved in the 70s and 80s) and a lot of its worst failures seem to be in IT. I wonder how much of government failures in IT are simply a result of the fact that most large institutions still haven’t worked out IT, coupled with the cheap trick in democracies of waving your “IT project” propaganda magic wand and not thinking about the fact that to get the benefits your policy claims, you have to implement something whose unrealistic expectations you’ve been pumping through your whole election campaign. I think that’s what Obama did with Obamacare: he couldn’t consider a proper public option, or the full regulation and subsidization regime required, so the gaps in his imperfect policy were filled with Big IT Project magic polyfilla … which is now starting to ooze out of those cracks …
October 29, 2013 at 9:36 am
”The examples you’ve given are a combination of regulation and taxation (with implied subsidization), so I’m going to take them as reinforcing my point.”
OK. It’s what they actually have already under Obamacare, so you have to give up your statement that:
”Because Obamacare is held hostage by free market ideology, they’re cleaving to the idea that they can construct a sustainable UHC system based almost entirely on the private market,”
Because clearly it’s broken free of it’s “free market ideology” enough to use “a combination of regulation and taxation (with implied subsidization)”.
” What will happen in such a situation is that a bunch of healthy young people will find themselves being forced to either pay huge tax penalties or pay premiums on a completely useless minimum package of insurance that they only took up because the tax penalties were so huge. ”
This is somewhat true in Australia. At $88k/year income you face a 1% tax (i.e. $880+/year) to avoid an insurance premium that (I quickly checked) comes in at around $650/year (after allowing for rebates). This matches the carrot and stick approach that I believe you’re suggesting for the US. The Australian excesses are also around $500 (which is a totally different proposition to the US excesses, so the comparison is pretty flawed even if we ignored the universal healthcare in Australia).
” I think if outsourcing were approached as a serious policy implementation vision, governments would naturally look for ways to manage and govern that process, and would soon set up contracting departments that would be ferociously good at screwing the contractors they were outsourcing to.”
Hmm. I can understand that (say) the Health Department is good at this, but your view of a “Screw contractors over” Department is still too optimistic. The banks I’ve worked with have such departments and despite this I’ve never felt I’ve been on the winning end of a statement of work/contract negotiation. It’s just never been our focus and we’ve never had the truly specialised knowledge that the guy who focuses on “Outsourcing widgets” does when compared to our “Outsourcing stuff associated with banks”.
IT is also just a bitch of thing to estimate and manage.
”I wonder how much of government failures in IT are simply a result of the fact that most large institutions still haven’t worked out IT”
Yeah. Agreed. See my comment directly above.
October 31, 2013 at 8:44 am
I just saw an interesting article by Mark Steyn [1] at: http://www.steynonline.com/5862/third-party-statism
There were two interesting bits:
1. “stitches together the rear ends of two pantomime horses and attempts to ride it to the sunlit uplands.”
I love that imagery 🙂
2. “The Democrats’ objection to the pre-Obama “private” health system is that Americans wound up spending more than any other country for what they argued were inferior health outcomes. But the more telling number is revealed by Avik Roy elsewhere in this issue: In 2010 (in other words, before Obamacare), U.S. government expenditures on health care were higher than those in all but three other countries in the world. Quick, name a European social democracy full of state-suckled wimpy welfare queens: France? $3,061 per capita in public-health expenditures. Sweden? $3,046 per capita. Belgium? $3,000. In 2010 the United States spent $3,967 in public-health expenditures per person — more than anywhere on the planet except Norway, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. I am confident that, under Obamacare, we’ll be outspending even the Norwegians. But in reality our so-called private system was a public system in all but name.”
I’d take Mark Steyn’s “statistics” with a dose of salt, but if (anywhere near) right this would support a topic I think we’ve danced around on this [2]: It’s not that the ideas are bad or the spending is too low/high – it’s just a uniquely American way of taking good ideas to deliver a terrible outcome for a silly cost.
Verifying the per capita public spend in the US pre-2010 is probably something you can dig up more easily than I can. But if right it’d be a major support for your argument (and that in the journals you quoted) that cost restraint (by centralised bargaining or frankly anything!) is the central challenge the US health system faces.
[1] We’ve discussed him previously, but for anyone foolish enough to jump into this discussion at this point: He’s a right wing libertarian with tea party sympathies who obsesses over Islamism. He also frequently has a clever turn of phrase.
[2] And explicitly said for the NHS in the UK
October 31, 2013 at 10:11 am
That’s a pretty funny image.
I think Steyn is quoting correct figures, and it’s hard to find more detail about them, but I think about half of the spending is on Medicare (for people aged over 65) and another third or so on Medicaid (for the poor). You can use this dodgy looking site to find more detail; there appears to be about 200 million $ (in 2010) that was devoted to the mysterious catch all “medical services,” and which could possibly be construed to mean that 20% of US funding is somehow intervening in private markets. But as far as I know that 500 million or so on Medicare is completely separate from private insurance markets – it is a govt insurance program for the elderly. Would Steyn prefer that the US’s elderly got dumped from the govt system and into his private insurance network? Does he think that would lower the cost of his insurance?
The interesting thing about Medicare is that it doesn’t actually provide much protection from financial catastrophe, and lots of recipients also get ancillary (private) coverage to support costs – it seems likely that in any year between 2 and 10% of Medicare recipients would suffer financial catastrophe without that protection. It could be that Medicare is badly run, or it could be that it reflects the true price of servicing the elderly, but the reality is that if the govt weren’t spending that money, Mark Steyn would be (through his insurance premiums) – the alternative being that the “Greatest Generation” get dumped from healthcare altogether. Have at it, Steyn, if you think that’s how America should treat its aging war heroes.
The problem with these glib denunciations of government involvement in healthcare is that they don’t provide an alternative. What does Steyn want in exchange for a reduction in public funding for healthcare? What are his posited alternatives? It’s all very well to get curmudgeonly about the trillion dollar cost of public funding for healthcare in the USA, but what alternative is he suggesting? That the private market that has driven up healthcare costs in the US faster and higher than anywhere else in the OECD should be asked to take on everyone over 65? Would its much-vaunted (and forever unrealized) efficiency work well for those people?
It’s also a good idea to consider what kind of government intervention this actually is. For example, running a 500 million US$ health fund for elderly people that purchases care from the private sector without any appreciable form of cost containment or financial protection for its subscribers could be portrayed as an example of socialism in action. Or it could be seen as a way to funnel huge amounts of money to the private sector without attaching many conditions of note. Which is it? An intervention, or a form of corporate welfare? I don’t think Steyn’s clear on that, and I doubt he understands enough about how Medicare works to be able to make a judgment. He certainly has put Obamacare in perspective though!
And yes, the most obvious answer is that it’s an example of the US being able to take a good idea and make it not work at a high price (at least the NHS makes an idea not work at a low price!)
I think any system is going to need mechanisms for cost containment that are more powerful than the private market as it operates in the US now. It could be that there is a way to regulate the private market that would enable it to achieve those cost containment goals, but given most of the world hasn’t tried (having moved straight to a public option), there is very little expertise out there and few models that can be tested to find out the best method for doing this. Will the US find a way, or will they turn to the tried-and-true cost containment techniques used in other countries? And what % of GDP will they end up spending on healthcare before they solve the problem?
October 31, 2013 at 11:15 am
”Would Steyn prefer that the US’s elderly got dumped from the govt system and into his private insurance network?”
” but the reality is that if the govt weren’t spending that money, Mark Steyn would be (through his insurance premiums) – the alternative being that the “Greatest Generation” get dumped from healthcare altogether”
I read Steyn’s point as being the same as you or I would make: If you spend as much government money per capita as the UK, then you should expect health outcomes at least as good as the NHS. The fact that it is then topped up with buckets of private money should mean that it should be substantially better than the UK.
Despite that, the UK has a higher life expectancy than the US (according to Wikipedia).
I don’t think Steyn makes the jump to “Therefore we should have a single public insurer option paid from general revenue” but he does manage to get as far as “The American health system is uniquely awful that it spends more than the NHS in public , spends additional private funds and still results in crappy outcomes.” Of course, he reaches this move from an Obama critique than free wheeling inquiry, but it’s still a valid point.
It also raises the question of whether you could get the Republicans on side by offering an NHS style system that rich people can opt (up and) out of Australian style [1].
”What does Steyn want in exchange for a reduction in public funding for healthcare?”
I don’t think he suggested a reduction in public funding for healthcare.
”What are his posited alternatives?”
I don’t think he suggested any. He was bitching about American “statism” that they refuse to acknowledge. And that they get terrible value from.
So Steyn is a right wing nut case, but you need to be open to the fact he may occasionally accidentally agree with you.
” I think any system is going to need mechanisms for cost containment that are more powerful than the private market as it operates in the US now.”
Judging by the American experience to date: Yes. But I don’t think Mark Steyn can (or at least has) make the jump to this idea.
” And what % of GDP will they end up spending on healthcare before they solve the problem?”
Well, my answer on this would be: They’re spending about 17% of GDP at the moment, therefore “Not much more”, because a significant increase would be unsustainable outside a country economy that resembles anything other than a scaled up old folks home.
[1] The answer is, of course, “No”. The tea party members are foaming at the mouth ideologues.
October 31, 2013 at 4:04 pm
I’m always happy to assume the worst about what Steyn is trying to say, so I’ll go with “abolish it all now!” as the sub-text of his article.
More seriously, is he at all aware of the obvious anti-free market implications of his article? If the US is spending more than other countries and getting less, but also happens to have a large private sector … maybe the private sector is crowding out the public? Also, he (and the Avik Roy article he doesn’t link to) both seem to be saying Obamacare is no big deal (it’s just a tiny fraction of total state funding). Is this what he wants to say? Is this what the shutdown was all about? Admittedly his article is mainly just a whinge (oh America, can you get anything right? Poor benighted soul!) but it doesn’t seem like his whinge is supporting his free market anti-Obamacare principles, generally. Or is he, as you so cutely imply, trying to hint at a new GOP tactic based on nationalizing the entire health system?
I remember Steyne wrote a superb piece of foolishness about Afghanistan based on Flashman, and completely failed to realize that every single sentence of the Flashman book he was referencing was bitterly opposed to exactly the kind of enterprise (war of choice) that Steyn’s article was trying to use it to support[1]. Sometimes I think Steyn is too caught up in his rhetoric to notice the logic.
I suspect more likely neither Roy nor Steyn realize what the majority of US govt funding on healthcare is, and they probably imagine it as some kind of nefarious series of subsidies aimed at propping up the worst practices in the healthcare industry. If challenged they would probably mutter darkly about good intentions leading to ruin, and play the role of stern cynical guys pointing out hard truths to naive hippies (as the “caring” libertarians at NRO love to do). What they probably wouldn’t do is show any awareness that the half a billion bucks they’re talking about is largely aimed at healthcare for the elderly. I’m sure they’d be horrified if some “liberal”[2] pointed out to them that the chief recipients of that half a billion are, by and large, more likely to vote Republican than much of the health-insurance purchasing community …
More seriously still … this article is a good example of how the issues in healthcare financing don’t come down primarily to how much you spend, but to how you spend it and how you control spending. That the UK can spend less in total and less govt money on healthcare but get similar health outcomes – that’s telling us a lot. And of course in Japan, Germany and France the outcomes are better still. If Steyn wants bang for his buck – private or public – then he needs to quit whinging and write (or encourage other NRO contributers to write) something intelligent about how to contain costs in a private healthcare system, and how to reconfigure that system so that it can service the elderly and those with pre-existing conditions. Until then, all he and his mates are doing is whinging and carping in favour of a system that clearly doesn’t work for the vast majority of the population. That ain’t policy development!
(And just to clarify, as I’ve said before many times on this blog, I’m not ideological about the systems required to achieve universal health coverage. If some libertarian at the NRO can come up with a private system that works, I’m all ears. If such a system existed and could be sold to the US public and policy elite it would be much, much more likely to be implemented than any “public option.” Why stand in the way of that? The only reason I can think of is that no one has proposed any such system that isn’t laughable).
—
fn1: that article was particularly frustrating because a) he was using one of my favourite authors to support his nasty obsession with Islam and b) he quoted a really racist piece from Flashman without any sense of the obvious piss-take that Flashman is, or any respect for the careful and respectful way in which George Macdonald Fraser wrote his Muslim characters. It was like a parody of a piss-take of a parody, done badly. This is not how literary criticism should proceed …
fn2: Fuck I hate the way American “liberals” who would be on the right of the Australian Liberal Party get called “liberals”.